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Abstract
This paper examines whether comparative advantage is the long-run outcome of an
evolutionary process in the open economy. It formalizes the notion that natural selection
eliminates inefﬁcient ﬁrms and thus leads to stable and perhaps efﬁcient patterns of world
trade. Instead of assuming the existence of a Walrasian auctioneer, we study two simple
matching processes that coordinate trade between ﬁrms. Our central result is that
specialization according to comparative advantage, with the larger country possibly
incompletely specialized, is the unique evolutionarily stable state of the world economy.
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The principle of survival of the ﬁttest can be regarded as a vast
generalization of Ricardian economics
2
John Maynard Keynes

1. Introduction
There is a story that makes the rounds among international economists. As a
young Fellow at Harvard, Paul Samuelson was challenged by one of his
colleagues—who later became a renowned physicist—to state ‘‘one idea in
economics that is true and not trivial’’. Samuelson immediately replied, ‘‘The
concept of comparative advantage’’. Some might argue that comparative advan
tage is to productive efﬁciency what the Pareto property is to distributive
efﬁciency. Both are ineluctable elements of a price-taking equilibrium, and they
serve to formalize the notion that the invisible hand tends to promote the social
good. This paper asks the question: Does an analog of the invisible hand lead to
production according to comparative advantage in an evolutionary model? Our
simple conclusion is: Yes.
Alchian (1950) is credited with the ﬁrst insight that economic phenomena could
be modeled in an evolutionary framework. He argued intuitively that natural
selection within markets shapes economic activity in the long run. The main
contribution of our work is to formalize his insight in a model of international
trade. We follow Ricardo (1817) and assume that countries face different constant
opportunity costs. Instead of modeling ﬁrms as price takers, we consider two
simple matching processes. A ﬁrm enjoys the gains from trade only if it is matched
with one that has a different good, and the gains from trade are divided according
to a simple trading convention. We ask whether the pattern of trade will converge
to that predicted by comparative advantage.
There are two approaches to studying comparative advantage in a Ricardian
framework. The ﬁrst and usual one assumes a perfectly competitive world market
in which domestic and foreign ﬁrms are price-takers. Building upon Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972) and Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997) have recently proposed a
second approach where markets are imperfectly competitive and ﬁrms choose
quantities strategically. They show that in a wide class of Ricardian economies, the
unique Nash equilibrium is autarky. Hence, production according to comparative
disadvantage can easily emerge. When the number of players in each country is
sufﬁciently large, an equilibrium with trade is possible, but the no-trade outcome
persists. Still, Cordella and Gabszewicz always maintain the assumption of a
Walrasian auctioneer who clears world markets 3 .
A competitive equilibrium ensures that all mutually beneﬁcial trades actually do
materialize. The mechanism studied by Cordella and Gabszewicz generates
another extreme outcome, in which it is possible that no mutually beneﬁcial trade
is realized. Perhaps a model that avoids these two extremes might better
approximate a complex modern economy. International markets are not friction
less, so some mutually beneﬁcial trades may not occur. And even casual
3
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imperfectly competitive models with Ricardian frameworks.

observation contradicts the prediction that no mutually beneﬁcial trade ever takes
place 4 . This paper proposes an alternative approach, combining elements of
perfect competition and strategic behavior in an evolutionary framework. We drop
the ideal of a Walrasian auctioneer and assume instead that a simple matching
process coordinates trade. If a producer is lucky enough to meet someone—
domestic or foreign—who has produced a different good, then a mutually
beneﬁcial trade occurs.
Here are the details of the production and matching processes. Producers
anywhere in the world can produce one of two goods. Before the match, a ﬁrm
produces a good. If two matched ﬁrms have the same good, then there are no gains
from trade and each ﬁrm consumes what it brought to the match. It is perhaps
useful to think of this as a sterile meeting, since it captures the idea that a mutually
beneﬁcial trade is not realized. Otherwise, there is a fertile meeting that may be
viewed as a temporary bilateral monopoly. The division of the gains from trade
then depends on the bargaining powers of the two ﬁrms, and we assume that they
share the social surplus equally 5 . This rule corresponds to the Nash bargaining
solution, since the threat point of either agent is to consume his own output,
yielding a utility level of zero for our speciﬁcation of preferences.
We study two matching processes: one where a ﬁrm can meet anyone and
another where a ﬁrm automatically meets a foreign counterpart. The ﬁrst
mechanism is general in that it allows both international and intra-national
matches, with the probability of each type of match being determined by the
relative sizes of the countries. Using the assumption of identical Cobb–Douglas
preferences, we show that the unique Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily stable and
that production follows comparative advantage. A small country specializes in the
good in which it has a comparative advantage, and a large country is incompletely
specialized. Our analysis suggests that the assumption of ‘‘sufﬁcient competitive
forces’’ (Cordella and Gabszewicz, 1997, p. 346) is not necessary for the world
economy to display convergence to an equilibrium where production follows
comparative advantage. Moreover, in an evolutionary framework, we make no
explicit assumptions about rationality, perfect information, or common knowledge.
Thus production according to comparative advantage is a deep outcome, even in a
matching model with explicit frictions that prevent market forces from working
their ineluctable magic.
It is natural to ask whether one can rationalize within our model the kind of
no-trade equilibrium that Cordella and Gabszewicz highlighted. Surprisingly, one
4
The empirical evidence on the Ricardian hypothesis suggests that the truth lies between these
extremes. For instance, Golub and Hsieh (2000) ﬁnd that a large proportion of the sectoral variation of
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statistically signiﬁcant.
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can. Our second matching process imposes that only international matches can
occur. In this case, the world economy has two Nash equilibria, both of which are
evolutionarily stable. One corresponds to complete specialization according to
comparative advantage, while the other entails the opposite pattern. In Cordella
and Gabszewicz, the ‘‘bad equilibrium’’ arises because the representative agent
has extreme preferences, deriving utility largely from the good in which it has
comparative disadvantage. In our model, home and foreign ﬁrms have identical
preferences and both goods are desirable. However, in our second matching
process, the ‘‘bad’’ outcome arises because foreigners are increasingly specialized
in the ‘‘wrong’’ good. No ﬁrm producing the ‘‘right’’ good will get a high payoff
because it has only a small chance of entering into a fertile match with its foreign
counterpart. Thus being locked into the wrong pattern of production can be
mutually reinforcing, if there is a strong restriction in the matching process.
Since the evolutionary model is dynamic, it is possible to identify initial
conditions under which the world economy will converge to the ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’
equilibrium. In particular, we show that if the initial conditions correspond to the
evolutionarily stable strategy for two hitherto closed economies, then the world
economy converges monotonically to the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium. Following Foster
and Young (1990), we also examine the consequences of small random shocks to
the pattern of production in each economy. Imposing an explicit process for
random mutations and using simulations, we show that the equilibrium with
comparative advantage is stochastically stable. Thus, even if the world economy is
stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium, in the very long run, the random mutations will
allow it to escape to the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium with comparative advantage.
Specialization according to comparative advantage turns out to be a robust
prediction of the evolutionary models we examine. We note in passing that this
result has implications beyond the arena of international trade. In particular, the
vast literature on search and matching has also studied deviations from frictionless
Arrow–Debreu economies. Two seminal papers are Diamond (1982) and Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989). Their common point of departure is the assumption that agents
cannot consume their own goods, and therefore, need to trade. This postulate
reﬂects the ‘‘advantage of specialized production and trade over self-sufﬁciency’’
(Diamond, 1982, p. 883). Diamond examines the implications of this idea for a
theory of unemployment, whilst Kiyotaki and Wright use it to develop a theory of
money. One can view our results as a theoretical underpinning for this crucial and
widespread assumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the concepts and methods of evolutionary game theory that are used
in this paper. In the third section we sketch the model for the closed economy and
describe static and dynamic aspects of its equilibrium. The fourth section studies
the open economy model with both international and intra-national matches. The
ﬁfth section studies the open economy under the restricted matching mechanism
and shows that multiple equilibria are possible. The sixth section imposes a

speciﬁc process for random mutations and discusses properties of the stochastical
ly stable set; several illuminating simulations are analyzed. The seventh section
presents some brief conclusions and suggestions for future research.

2. A thumbnail sketch of evolutionary game theory for the international
economist
Applying evolutionary game theory to comparative advantage is a surprisingly
open area of research. Thus there is very little literature upon which we build
directly. The only application of evolutionary game theory in international
economics is by Friedman and Fung (1996), but they study the organization of
ﬁrms, not the evolution of comparative advantage. On the other hand, there is a
vast literature on international trade under less than perfect competition.
The literature on evolutionary game theory has grown rapidly in the last decade.
An important early article is by Friedman (1991, 1998) summarizes the same ideas
in a technically less demanding fashion. There are now three excellent books
summarizing this body of research: Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997) and
Vega-Redondo (1996). Using dynamics that stress imitation and mutation, Vega
Redondo (1997) studies the evolution of price-taking behavior in partial equilib
rium. He uses a model with ﬁnitely many ﬁrms producing a homogenous good.
Such an analysis is of limited interest for international economists because there is
no reason for trade.
The fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory is the notion of an
evolutionarily stable strategy. Consider a large population of identical agents. A
biologist would call this a monomorphic population, and an international econom
ist might think of this as a closed economy. These agents meet often in random
pair-wise matches. Each agent is completely described by its list of behaviors
(pure strategies) and by a function describing the ﬁtness (payoff) that arises when
any one behavior meets another. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a symmetric
equilibrium that satisﬁes two properties. First, each strategy must be a best
response to itself. Second, if a sufﬁciently small fraction of the population adopts
another strategy, then agents who stick with the original one should earn a higher
payoff than those who decided to switch. Thus a strict Nash equilibrium is an
evolutionarily stable strategy because it is a best response to itself and to other
mixed strategies that are close enough to it. If the equilibrium is a mixture of
several pure strategies, then there are several best responses to it 6 . Now one has to
check the second condition; this property is summarized by the idea that the
6
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original (equilibrium) strategy has a higher degree of ﬁtness against the mutants
than the mutants have against themselves.
For an international economist, a model of a monomorphic population is less
than half the picture. Now consider a bimorphic population, one with two types of
agents; a moment’s reﬂection shows that the genetic characteristics of foxes will
certainly inﬂuence natural selection in the population of rabbits (and vice versa).
The study of bimorphic populations is natural for an international economist, since
the characteristics of foreign ﬁrms inﬂuence the proﬁtability of domestic produc
ers. Now the deﬁnition of an evolutionarily stable strategy is not so straight
forward. We follow the usual convention and analyze Nash equilibria that are
resistant to invasion by a small share of mutants within one population at a time.
Thus a rabbit gene that ‘‘causes’’ fast running is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
a sufﬁciently small share of mutant slow bunnies does not fare well against the
current population of foxes.
In our evolutionary model, there are two behaviors in the population of
domestic ﬁrms: producing the ﬁrst or second good. We show that the matching
process in the closed economy gives rise to a Hawk–Dove game. A population full
of hawks—ﬁrms with a predisposition for producing the ﬁrst good—is not going
to have a high level of average ﬁtness. Likewise, a population full of doves—ﬁrms
producing only the second good—will run into similar difﬁculties. As we shall see
below, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy for the closed economy consists of
a mix of hawks and doves. If preferences satisfy some simple properties and the
gains from trade are divided according Nash bargaining, then this mix induces
exactly the shares of ﬁrms in each sector that maximizes expected social surplus.
Thus our matching process has some attractive properties for the closed economy.
When an economy opens for international trade, something different occurs.
Now the world economy consists literally of two different species: homeboys and
foreign animals. Homeboys and foreign animals face different technological
tradeoffs. At ﬁrst, both homeboys and foreign animals have distributions of
behaviors, with some producing the ﬁrst good and others the second. Fitness is
determined by a continual series of matches between animals on the world stage 7 .
In our general model, homeboys can meet anyone, including their own ilk. In this
model, comparative advantage arises naturally, and it is the unique evolutionarily
stable state. In the restricted model, homeboys can only meet foreign animals.
Now there are two evolutionarily stable strategies: one in which all the homeboys
produce the ﬁrst good and all the foreign animals produce the second good and the
other with the opposite pattern of trade.
Why does the situation with restricted matches give rise to such a different
outcome? Selten (1980) has the right intuition; since homeboys always meet
foreign animals, no distribution of behaviors on the interior of the simplex is
7
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stable. If two strategies have the same payoffs, then nothing punishes genetic drift.
On the other hand, in the general model, if a small share of mutants enters the
world economy, the corresponding behavior will meet itself with strictly positive
probability and the expected ﬁtness of the entrants drops. Thus the original
distribution of strategies following comparative advantage is stable.
A big advantage of evolutionary game theory is that there is a natural link with
a dynamical system whose state is the distribution of strategies in the population.
There are different rules for describing the dynamics of the system, but the most
common is perhaps the replicator dynamic. This rule states that a strategy’s
relative share in the population increases in proportion to how much its ﬁtness
exceeds the average level of ﬁtness. It is perhaps the simplest way to capture
Darwin’s deep insight. While the assumption of replicator dynamics is natural for
biological models, it requires some justiﬁcation in an economic model. There are
at least four reasons for choosing this rule. First, it is computationally simple and
easy to exposit. Second, it allows for some inertia in the model because the
distribution of strategies changes gradually rather than abruptly (Friedman, 1998).
Third, if imitation is the economic analog of genetic transmission and an important
component of how agents learn, then the replicator dynamics is likely to provide a
good approximation to the process of strategy selection (Samuelson, 1997, p. 63).
Finally, under the replicator dynamics, an evolutionarily stable strategy is also an
evolutionary equilibrium, in the sense that no small-scale invasion by equilibrium
entrants can push the world economy away from this pattern of production.
We do not explicitly model the learning behavior of ﬁrms, but simply note that a
variety of imitation-driven models give rise to the dynamics assumed here, at least
approximately. For instance, suppose that ﬁrms are inﬁnitely lived and boundedly
rational. After each period, a ﬁrm reviews its strategy by sampling another ﬁrm at
random. The reviewing ﬁrm observes its payoff and that of the sampled ﬁrm with
some noise. If the observed difference is positive, the reviewing ﬁrm switches to
the sampled ﬁrm’s strategy; otherwise it continues with the old strategy. If the
noise process is uniformly distributed, the imitation dynamics of this model are
simply a rescaling of the replicator dynamics by a positive constant 8 . Given that
there is no consensus yet on the most reasonable general approach to modeling
learning by economic agents, using the replicator dynamics seems appropriate for
our purposes. We study some dynamic properties of the closed and open
economies at several points in the analysis below.
Imposing an explicit process for random mutations and using simulations, we
show that the equilibrium with comparative advantage is stochastically stable. An
8
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equilibrium of a biological system—thought of as a population state—is stochas
tically stable if, as the probability of mutations becomes asymptotically small, the
population spends almost all its time in a neighborhood of this state. Thus, even if
the world economy is initially stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium, in the (very) long
run, random mutations will allow it to escape. When there is strong comparative
advantage, the expected waiting time for the ‘‘right’’ equilibrium will be short
enough, but for plausible calibrations with fairly large mutations, it may take ﬁve
centuries of monthly trading for the right conﬁguration of mutations to arise!

3. The model in a closed economy
The closed economy consists of a continuum of identical agents. Each agent is
both a consumer and producer. There are two commodities in the world economy,
and the representative agent’s preferences are summarized by the log-linear utility
function u: R 21 → R whose rule is u(x) 5 (x 1 )a (x 2 )12 a . Each agent is endowed
with one unit of time, and the production process is indivisible, so that an agent
can produce either good 1 or good 2, but not both. Thus each agent has the
production set Y 5 h(1 /a 1 , 0)T , (0, 1 /a 2 )T j , R 21 where a 5 (a 1 , a 2 )T is the vector
of labor coefﬁcients. Since this set is not convex, each agent is forced to trade if it
wants a mix of the two goods. In each period, an agent produces one of the goods
without knowing what the rest of the population has chosen. Even though each
agent’s production set is not convex, the production possibility frontier for the
entire economy is. In essence, nature can choose any fraction of a large population
of agents to produce either good, and she faces the typical constant opportunity
cost that characterizes the essence of a Ricardian technology 9 . When a random
match occurs, the surplus is split according to simple Nash bargaining. Let
u h (1 / 2)u(1 /a 1 , 1 /a 2 ); we can now summarize this aspect of the model succinctly.
Assumption 1. The (row player’s) payoffs in the closed economy are

F

A5

0
uh

G

uh
.
0

The upper left element is the row player’s payoff if he produces the ﬁrst good and
has a sterile match; the upper right element is his payoff if he meets a column
player who has produced the second good and thus has a fertile match. The
payoffs correspond to Nash bargaining solution in each of the four possible
9

Alternatively, one can also view each individual agent as ‘‘choosing’’ a possibly mixed strategy
r5(r 1 , 12r 1 ), 0#r 1 #1, where r 1 is the probability of producing the ﬁrst good. Allowing for mixed
strategies renders each agent’s strategy choice set convex, and aggregating over all agents and
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outcomes. It is obvious that a population of agents producing only the ﬁrst good
will not fare well. Random matching introduces an explicit friction into this
economy, and an important element of the theoretical analysis is to show that
pattern of trade largely follows comparative advantage in spite of this strong
trading imperfection.
Let D 5hs[R 21 us 1 1s 2 51j be the relevant simplex. The state of the system is
an element s[ D describing the distribution of the population producing each
good. A strategy for a home or foreign ﬁrm is a vector r5(r 1 , r 2 )T [ D with the
interpretation that the ﬁrm produces good 1 with probability r 1 and good 2 with
probability r 2 . Then the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm that plays strategy r5(r 1 , r 2 )T when the
state is s[ D is f(r, s)5r T As. Some simple algebra shows that
f(r, s) 5 (r 1 s 2 1 r 2 s 1 )u h
We can now state our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 3.1. The model in the closed economy is a Hawk–Dove game. Its
unique evolutionarily stable strategy is ŝ5(1 / 2, 1 / 2)T . Moreover, this strategy
maximizes social surplus, given the matching technology.
Proof. The model is a Hawk–Dove game because the diagonal elements of the
payoff matrix are zero and its off-diagonal elements are positive. Since the best
response to state s[ D is r5(1, 0)T if s 2 .1 / 2 and r5(0, 1)T if s 1 .1 / 2, it is easy
to see that the unique Nash equilibrium is ŝ5(1 / 2, 1 / 2)T . Since this is not a strict
Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for any r±ŝ there exists ´ .0 such that
f(ŝ, s´ ).f(r, s´ ), where s´ 5(12 ´)ŝ 1 ´r. The ﬁtness of the original population is
f(ŝ, s´ )5(12 ´)u h / 21 ´(r 1 1r 2 )u h / 2 and that of the mutants is
(1 2 ´)(r 1 1 r 2 )u h
f(r, s´ ) 5 ]]]]] 1 ´(r 1 r 2 1 r 2 r 1 )u h .
2
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S D , s ) 2 f((r , r ) , s )) 5 ´S]21 2 2r r Du . 0.
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This inequality is true because (1 / 222r 1 r 2 )$0, with equality only if 1 / 25r 1 5
r 2 . Hence, for any ´ .0, f(ŝ, s´ ).f(r, s´ ) and the population state ŝ5(1 / 2, 1 / 2)T
is an evolutionarily stable strategy.
The strategy ŝ5(1 / 2, 1 / 2)T maximizes expected social surplus because it
maximizes the chance of fertile matches. h
ˆ sˆ )5u h / 2. If each ﬁrm
The ﬁtness of the population of domestic ﬁrms is f(s,
could be assured of meeting an appropriate counterpart with the opposite good,
then the average welfare of the population would be u h . But half that surplus is

lost because the random matching process cannot guarantee that every match is
fertile. Still, it is noteworthy that the ‘‘correct’’ shares of ﬁrms go into the each
industry. These shares are correct since the Nash bargaining rule splits the surplus
from a fertile match equally.
Now let z[ D be any arbitrary population state, with the usual interpretation that
the fraction 0#z i #1 of the population is of the i-th type. The replicator dynamics
are described by
z~ i 5 (e i 2 z)T (Az)z i ,
i

where e is the vector with unity in the i-th position and zero elsewhere. Some
simple calculations show that z~ 1 5(122z 1 )z 1 z 2 u h and z~ 2 5 2 z~ 1 . Convergence to
the evolutionarily stable strategy is quick if the average level of productivity is
high.

4. A general matching model for the open economy
This section extends the model to allow for international matches. Now trade
can take place both within an economy and between economies, since a home ﬁrm
can be matched with any ﬁrm in the world. Let m denote the relative size of the
home country and 12 m that of foreign country. Firms in this world population are
randomly matched, so for any ﬁrm—home or foreign—the probability of being
matched with a home ﬁrm is simply m. We summarize the matching process:
Assumption 2. The probability of meeting a domestic (foreign) ﬁrm is equal to the
share of domestic (foreign) ﬁrms in the world population.
Now consider the open economy modeled as a bimorphic population of home
and foreign ﬁrms. In order to keep the equilibrium as simple as possible, we
assume that both countries have identical preferences again represented by u(x)5
(x 1 )a (x 2 )12 a . The production set for the foreign country is given by Y*5h(1 /a 1* ,
T
T
T
0) , (0, 1 /a *2 ) j where a*5(a *1 , a *2 ) is the vector of labor coefﬁcients for the
foreign country. With only slight loss of generality, we assume that a 1 /a 1* ,a 2 /a 2* ,
namely that the home country has strict comparative advantage in good 1.
In the event that a home ﬁrm is matched with another home ﬁrm, the same
matrix A describes its payoffs. Let u f 5(1 / 2)u(1 /a 1* , 1 /a 2* ). The following is the
analog of Assumption 1.
Assumption 1*. The foreign (row player’s) payoffs for intra-national foreign
matches are

F G

A* 5

0
uf

uf
.
0

Consider any ﬁrm that has been matched with a counterpart from abroad, and let
ū5(1 / 2)u(1 /a 1 , 1 /a 2* ) and ū5(1 / 2)u(1 /a *1 , 1 /a 2 ). Note that the assumption of
¯ ¯ a fact that will be very
identical Cobb–Douglas preferences implies that u h u f 5uu,
useful in the proofs below. We summarize our assumptions for international
matches:
Assumption 3. The domestic (row player’s) payoffs in an international match are

F G

0 ū
B5 u 0 .
]
¯¯
Also, ū .u,
] and u h u f 5uu.
The diagonal elements of B correspond to the payoffs from the sterile
encounters. In a fertile encounter, we assume again that the resulting social surplus
is divided equally. The element ū is the payoff when a match follows production
according to comparative advantage, and u] is the payoff for the opposite
conﬁguration of goods. Since preferences and the simple rule for dividing the
gains from trade might confound comparative advantage we postulate further that
10
ū .u.
] A sufﬁcient condition is a $1 / 2 . Since there is no price mechanism
guiding production in this model, it is important that a fertile match according to
comparative advantage have a relatively high payoff.
These matrices enable us to deﬁne the ﬁtness functions for the representative
agent in the home or foreign country. Recall that D is the one-dimensional
simplex; now the state space S5 D 3 D gives a complete description of the
population shares of domestic and foreign ﬁrms producing the two different goods.
A generic element is s5(z, z*)[S, where z5(z 1 , z 2 )T is the vector of population
shares of home ﬁrms in the two sectors and z*5(z 1* , z 2* )T is analogous for the
shares of foreign ﬁrms.
The ﬁtness of a domestic ﬁrm that plays strategy r5(r 1 , r 2 )T , when the state is
s[S, is f(r, s)5 m r T Az1(12 m )r T Bz*. Some simple algebra shows that
f(r, s) 5 [ m z 2 u h 1 (1 2 m )z *2 u¯ ]r 1 1 [ m z 1 u h 1 (1 2 m )z *1 u]r 2 .
(1)
]
The expression in the ﬁrst square bracket in (1) is the expected payoff from
producing good 1 and meeting either a home ﬁrm or a foreign ﬁrm and then
having a fertile match, and that in the second square bracket is the expected payoff
from producing good 2. It is now easy to see that the ﬁtness of a foreign ﬁrm is
f *(r, s)5 m r T B T z1(12 m )r T A*z*, or
f *(r, s) 5 [ m z 2]u 1 (1 2 m )z 2* u f ]r 1 1 [ m z 1 ū 1 (1 2 m )z 1* u f ]r 2 .

(1*)

Eq. (1*) is of course exactly analogous to (1).
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comparative advantage in the ﬁrst good, the right side of this inequality is not greater than 1 / 2.

A state s5(z, z*)[S is a Nash equilibrium for the evolutionary game deﬁned
by the ﬁtness functions f(., .) and f *(., .) if f(z, s)$f(r, s) and f *(z*, s)$f *(r, s) for
all r[ D. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium s5(z, z*)[S
such that the following two conditions are satisﬁed. First, for domestic ﬁrms it
must be the case that: either (i) f(z, s).f(r, s) for all r±z[ D; or (ii) if f(z; s)5f(r;
s) for some r[ D, then there exists ´ .0 such that f(z, s´ ).f(r, s´ ), where
s´ 5(12 ´)s1 ´(r, z*). Second, for foreign ﬁrms it must be true that: either (i)
f *(z*, s).f *(r, s) for all r±z*[ D; or (ii) if f *(z*, s)5f *(r, s) for some r[ D,
then there exists ´ .0 such that f *(z*, s´ ).f *(r, s´ ), where now s´ 5(12 ´)s1 ´(z,
r).
We can now begin the description of the evolutionarily stable strategies. Notice
ﬁrst that neither ((1, 0)T , (1, 0)T )[S nor ((0, 1)T , (0, 1)T )[S is a Nash
equilibrium, since it would never be optimal to enter into a sterile match with
certainty. Could it be a Nash equilibrium to produce according to comparative
disadvantage? We will demonstrate in four steps that this cannot happen. First, we
will show that it is not a Nash equilibrium for both countries to specialize
according to comparative disadvantage. Second, we will demonstrate that it is not
a Nash equilibrium for either country to specialize according to comparative
disadvantage, even if its trading partner is incompletely specialized. Third, we will
show that it is not a Nash equilibrium for both countries to be incompletely
specialized. Finally, we will show that specialization according to comparative
advantage is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy.
Proposition 4.1. Complete specialization according to comparative disadvantage
is not an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
The intuition behind Proposition 4.1 is that producing according to complete
comparative disadvantage is so unﬁt that either a home ﬁrm or a foreign ﬁrm (or
both) would ﬁnd it preferable to switch to the sector in which it has a comparative
advantage, even if it only has fertile matches with ﬁrms in its own country.
We still need to check whether one country can specialize in the good in which
it has a comparative disadvantage while the other country is incompletely
specialized. We now state.
Proposition 4.2. No Nash equilibrium is such that a country is completely
specialized in the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
The intuition behind Proposition 4.2 is that specializing according to comparative

disadvantage gives such a low level of ﬁtness that switching goods is an
improvement, even if one only meets a few foreign ﬁrms.
Since an evolutionarily stable strategy is necessarily a Nash equilibrium, the
following obtains.
Corollary 4.3. The pattern of production in which both countries follow
comparative disadvantage is not an evolutionarily stable strategy.
The following narrows the set of equilibria further.
Proposition 4.4. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both countries are
incompletely specialized.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
We still have to show that a Nash equilibrium in which production follows
comparative advantage is indeed evolutionarily stable. We do this by assuming that
the ﬁrms’ choices are best responses and checking whether they satisfy the extra
condition that characterizes evolutionary stability.
Proposition 4.5. The pattern of production according to comparative advantage is
evolutionarily stable.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
We can now state the central contribution of our research
Theorem 4.6. Under Assumptions 1, 1*, 2 and 3, the evolutionarily stable
strategies are unique. If the relative size parameter m , uf /(uf 1 ū ), then the home
country is completely specialized according to comparative advantage and the
foreign country is incompletely specialized. If uf /(uf 1 ū ) # m # ū /(u h 1 ū ), then
both countries are completely specialized according to comparative advantage. If
ū /(u h 1ū ), m, the foreign country is completely specialized according to com
parative advantage and the home country is incompletely specialized.
Proof. If the foreign country is incompletely specialized, then a foreign ﬁrm must
be indifferent between entering the ﬁrst or second sector. Hence, (12 m )z *2 u f 5
m ū 1(12 m )z *1 u f . It is easy to check that the solution to this equation has
0,z *1 ,1 / 2 if and only if 0, m ,u f /(u f 1ū ). If this condition is true, then
Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 show that the home country must be specialized in the
ﬁrst sector.
If the home country is incompletely specialized, then a home ﬁrm must be
indifferent between entering the ﬁrst or second sector. Hence, (12 m )ū 1 m z 2 u h 5

m z 1 u h . The solution to this equation has 1 / 2,z 1 ,1 if and only if ū /(u h 1ū ),
m ,1. If this condition is true, then Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 show that the foreign
country must be completely specialized in the second sector.
In both these cases, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium follows from the
linearity of the ﬁtness functions f(., .) and f *(., .) in the state variables z and z*. If
the home country is completely specialized, there is a unique distribution of ﬁrms
that makes a foreign ﬁrm indifferent between producing the two goods. The same
is true for the case when the foreign country is completely specialized.
If u f /(u f 1ū )# m #ū /(u h 1ū ), then neither country can be indifferent about
which good it produces and thus both countries must be completely specialized.
Proposition 4.2 shows that both countries must be completely specialized
according to comparative advantage. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is
trivially implied here.
In each case, the uniqueness of the evolutionarily stable strategy follows from
the uniqueness of the corresponding Nash equilibrium. h
This theorem is the main contribution of our work. It shows that production
according to comparative advantage arises naturally in a matching model in which
the agents exhibit little (if any) rationality. Our model is so simple that there is no
role for prices. Thus we have had to assume a match according to comparative
advantage yields higher utility than one according to comparative disadvantage,
but Assumption 3 is more stringent than necessary. In particular, it will always be
the case that a (perhaps asymmetric) social convention could arise in which both
foreign and domestic agents could divide the surplus from producing according to
comparative advantage in a way that was Pareto superior to producing according
to comparative disadvantage. This is true even if the agents have different
preferences that need not be homothetic. It is likely that (asymmetric) versions of
all the propositions in this section would also be true. We conjecture that
production according to comparative advantage will arise in a more general model,
but have made enough simplifying assumptions in this section so that the social
convention based upon Nash bargaining gives us Theorem 4.6.
We also ought to make an important observation about the welfare effects of
trade in this version of the model. Theorem 4.6 says nothing about the gains from
trade; it is a description of the pattern of exports in a model with severe market
frictions and a simple convention for dividing the gains inherent in a fertile match.
It is easy to see that a country with a strong absolute advantage in both goods may
well experience lower average utility from trade 11 ; after all, Assumption 3 does
not impose that ū .u h or ū .u f , but only that ū .u.
] We do not feel that this
11
We thank Priya Ranjan, our discussant at the University of California at Santa Cruz’s New
Methods in International Economics Workshop, for making this point so clearly. We conjecture that a
more sophisticated convention for dividing the gains from trade would guarantee not only that trade
followed comparative advantage but also that it did not lower average welfare for either country.

observation is a weakness of the model. Instead, it shows that even in a severely
distorted world economy, the old magic of comparative advantage predicts the
pattern of trade well.
How will the distribution of ﬁrms in the world economy evolve? Let s5(z,
z*)[ D 3 D be the population state. Now the replicator dynamics for domestic
ﬁrms in industry i are:
z~ i 5 [e i 2 z] T [ m Az 1 (1 2 m )Bz*]z i ,
where again e i is a vector with unity in the i-th position and zeros elsewhere. The
analogous dynamic for foreign ﬁrms is:
z~ *i 5 [e i 2 z*] T [ m B T z 1 (1 2 m )A*z*]z *i .
This coupled system of differential equations describes the dynamics of the world
economy.
Fig. 1 is worth a thousand words 12 . The locus L h is the set of points in the state
space such that the share of domestic ﬁrms in either industry is constant. Consider
its leftmost point; the parameters are such that even if all the foreign ﬁrms are
specialized in the ﬁrst (and thus wrong) sector and about 20% of the home ﬁrms
are producing that good, then a domestic ﬁrm is indifferent between either activity.
Points below this locus will be such that a home ﬁrm ﬁnds the ﬁrst activity
relatively proﬁtable and the share of domestic ﬁrms in the ﬁrst (right) sector is
increasing. The L h locus slopes down because now decreased foreign competition
is offset by increased local competition. Likewise, the locus L f is the set of points

Fig. 1. Complete specialization phase diagram.
12
In this case and all subsequent simulations, we set a5(1, 2)T , a*5(2.5, 1)T , m 50.5, and a 50.5.
The home country has moderate comparative advantage in good 1, and preferences are well behaved.

such that the share of foreign ﬁrms in either industry is also constant. Points below
this locus are such that the share of foreign ﬁrms in industry 1 is increasing since
there is little international competition in this industry. Since the home country has
comparative advantage in good 1, the L h locus is everywhere above L f ; a ﬁrm in
the home country can tolerate a higher fraction of foreign ﬁrms in industry one and
still break even.
Fig. 1 underscores two crucial features of the general matching model. First,
while the upper left corner is an absorbing state, it is not stable. Only absorbing
states on the lower or right edge of the state space are. Since the parameters have
been chosen to correspond to complete specialization, the lower right corner in
Fig. 1 is the unique evolutionary equilibrium in this general matching model. Of
course, if the parameters allowed for incomplete specialization, then there would
be an absorbing state on the lower edge or on the right edge of the state space 13 .
Second, the transitional dynamics need not be monotone. Indeed, it is possible to
have initial conditions such that the share of ﬁrms in an industry is ﬁrst increasing
and then decreasing as the system adjusts to its long-run equilibrium.

5. A restricted matching model
In this section we analyze a slightly different model in which only international
matches occur. Such a model might make sense if there were an equal number of
home and foreign ﬁrms and if one thought of international trade as a special kind
of matching process that assured that pairs of ﬁrms from two different countries
meet in a special location, perhaps called ‘‘an international trading post’’.
Assumption 4. Every match is between a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm.
Agents still have identical preferences represented by a Cobb–Douglas utility
function. Also, we continue to assume without loss of generality that the home
country has comparative advantage in the ﬁrst good. Still, there is one technicality
about the production sets that the international economist must address. Until now,
the population share determines a country’s size. In a Ricardian model size
matters, so we would be remiss if we forced the countries to be of equal size just
to accommodate our restricted matching mechanism. Hence we will continue to
assume that the production set of a home ﬁrm is the doubleton Y5h(1 /a 1 , 0)T , (0,
1 /a 2 )T j, but we will modify the production set of the foreign ﬁrm to be
13

With these production and taste parameters, if m ,0.38 then the foreign country is large, and if
m .0.58 then the home country is large. If the foreign country is large, both loci intersect the right edge
of the state space, and the equilibrium occurs at the bottom right point of L f since the marginal foreign
ﬁrm is indifferent between the two activities. Analogous statements are true when the home country is
large and the equilibrium is on the bottom edge of the state space at the bottom right point of L h .

Y*5h(L* /a *1 , 0)T , (0, L* /a *2 )T j. Each home ﬁrm still has one unit of labor, but
foreign ﬁrms are endowed with L* units.
˜
Let ũ5(1
/a 1 )a (L* /a 2* )12 a and ũ5(L* /a 1* )a (1 /a 2 )12 a . We again assume that
ũ˜ . ũ, and this condition is satisﬁed automatically if producing according to
comparative advantage generates greater social surplus and the foreign country is
not too large 14 . We can now summarize:
Assumption 5. The domestic (row player’s) payoffs in an international match are

F G

B˜ 5 0
ũ
Also, ũ˜ . ũ.

ũ˜ .
0

˜ and f *(r,
The domestic and foreign ﬁtness functions are now f(r, s)5r T Bz*
T˜ T
s)5r B z, respectively. Eqs. (2) and (2*) give the relevant ﬁtness functions in
this case.
˜˜ 2* 1 r 2 uz
˜ 1*
f(r, s) 5 r 1 uz

(2)

˜ 2 1 r 2 uz
˜˜ 1 .
f *(r, s) 5 r 1 uz

(2*)

and

Proposition 5.1. Impose Assumptions 4 and 5. Then there are two evolutionarily
stable strategies, one with production according to comparative advantage and
another with production according to comparative disadvantage.
Proof. See Appendix A. h
The intuition is that the restricted matching process can lock ﬁrms into the wrong
pattern of production because mutants will never meet anyone with whom to
trade 15 .
Now the replicator dynamics for domestic ﬁrms in industry i are:
i
T ˜
z~ i 5 (e 2 z) (Bz*)z
i,

and that for foreign ﬁrms is:
T

z~ *i 5 (e i 2 z*)T (B˜ z)z i* .
14
The exact condition is ln(u¯ /u¯ ).(2a 21)ln L*. Thus Assumption 5 is a bit more stringent than
Assumption 3 since it puts a restriction on the size of the foreign country.
15
An anonymous referee made the interesting observation that even the ‘‘wrong’’ assignment in this
version of the model may well represent an increase in the average utility of both countries. These
gains from trade are ‘‘non-Ricardian’’, and exist because trade leads to a greater division of labor
within in each country so that in the evolutionarily stable state all sterile matches are eliminated.

In this case, the state space S5 D 3 D can be divided into four quadrants. The
unstable Nash equilibrium has zˆ 1 5 u˜ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ) and zˆ 1* 5 u˜˜ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ). If z 1* .zˆ 1* ,
then z~ 1 ,0 and the home country is being pushed away from producing according
to comparative advantage. Likewise, if z 1 ,ẑ 1 , then z~ 1* .0 and the foreign country
is also being pushed in the ‘‘wrong’’ direction. How likely is it that the world
economy will get stuck in the ‘‘wrong’’ equilibrium? A natural starting point for
the bimorphic population is s(0)5((1 / 2, 1 / 2)T , (1 / 2, 1 / 2)T ), when two closed
economies in long-run equilibrium open for international trade. The world
economy will exhibit monotonic convergence to the equilibrium with comparative
advantage if ẑ 1 , 1 / 2 , ẑ 1* . Since production according to comparative advantage
generates greater social surplus, this chain of strict inequalities is true.
For an economist, it might be surprising that the equilibrium with comparative
disadvantage is evolutionarily stable. Still, the essence of international trade is that
there is an inherent difference between a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm. In a
biological model, this fact connotes an ineluctable element of asymmetry, and the
analysis of asymmetric conﬂicts is an ongoing area of research in evolutionary
theory. Building on Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) and Maynard Smith (1982)
himself coined the term the ‘‘Bourgeois Principle’’ in analyzing the bimorphic
generalization of the Hawk–Dove game. Consider a situation in which a
homeowner meets an intruder; Maynard Smith and Parker argue that the
equilibrium in which the owner ﬁghts if the intruder ﬂees and the intruder ﬂees if
the owner ﬁghts is the only ‘‘natural’’ evolutionarily stable strategy 16 . This is the
Bourgeois principle, and it corresponds to the idea that the natural asymmetries
arising in international trade will ensure that the equilibrium with comparative
advantage will be selected.
This line of reasoning may be faulty in an economic environment. In a model
with restricted bilateral matching, there is no guarantee that a sufﬁciently
entrenched pattern of production will be displaced by foreign competition. Grafen
(1987) ﬁrst made this point in a biological model; in an owner–intruder conﬂict,
the intruder has nothing to lose if ﬂeeing confers no genetic advantage. Thus he
may well ﬁght, and Grafen calls this phenomenon the ‘‘Desperado effect’’. In the
model in this section, the equilibrium where both countries produce according to
comparative disadvantage has this ﬂavor. There are myriad examples in economic
geography where the location of industry is determined largely by historical
happenstance, and political considerations often maintain a seemingly inefﬁcient
pattern of international production. Using a model with exogenous probabilities of
death, Eshel and Sansone (1995) show that that there are sound theoretical reasons
for either equilibrium to arise in bimorphic populations in the Hawk–Dove game.
16
Davies (1978) describes the behavior of the speckled wood butterﬂy and shows that the ‘‘owner’’
of a sunny spot on the forest ﬂoor almost always wins conﬂicts with an otherwise identical intruder.
Still, Maynard Smith (1982) (p. 96) describes the unusual case of the social spider Oecibus civitas that
apparently abandons a refuge hole if challenged by an intruder.

More recently, Binmore and Samuelson (2001) show that in asymmetric games
with perturbed payoffs, approximations of mixed equilibria can be evolutionarily
stable, thus blurring the sharp distinction between symmetric and asymmetric
games.

6. Stochastic dynamics in the open economy
In this section, we will apply Foster and Young’s (1990) techniques to analyze
the stochastically stable equilibrium in the open economy. The analysis in Section
5 is a slight disappointment because there are initial conditions such that the world
economy will eventually become polarized according to comparative disadvantage.
If the initial distribution of ﬁrms in one country is biased towards the wrong
sector, then it can force its trading partner to produce the wrong good in turn, and
this downward spiral of comparative disadvantage reinforces itself. The crux of the
problem is that one country is locked into the wrong technique at an early stage of
international trade.
Of course, the evolution of the population of ﬁrms in a country is not really a
deterministic system. Firms in senescent industries might be kept alive in part by
rent seeking, and ﬁrms in growing industries may not immediately prosper because
of idiosyncratic constraints in the labor or credit market. Also, an adverse
terms-of-trade shock will simultaneously protect inefﬁcient import-competing
ﬁrms while making it more difﬁcult for ﬁrms in a nascent exporting industry to
prosper. Thus it is quite appropriate to posit a more general stochastic rule for the
evolution of the populations of ﬁrms that allows small random effects to inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ survival rates. Following Foster and Young (1990), we now assume that the
evolution of the share of domestic ﬁrms in the i-th industry is well approximated
by a Wiener process:
dz i 5 [e i 2 z] T [( m Az 1 (1 2 m )Bz*)dt 1 sG (z)dW]z i
where G (z) is a 232 matrix continuous in z and satisfying the property that
z T G (z)5(0, 0), and W is an 231 continuous white-noise process with mean zero
and unit variance covariance matrix. We have suppressed the dependence of z(t),
z*(t), and W(t) in this expression for ease of exposition. Likewise, the evolution of
foreign ﬁrms is governed by:
dz *i 5 [e i 2 z*] T [( m B T z 1 (1 2 m )A*z*)dt 1 s *G *(z*)dW*]z i*
where all the terms are analogous. We assume that the stochastic processes W(t)
and W*(t) are independent; in essence, we are imposing that the idiosyncratic
mutations that affect domestic ﬁrms do not spill across the border. Population

distributions on the corners of the state space are absorbing. Thus it is natural
examine its interior. We ﬁx d .0 and consider the restricted state space Sd 5[d,
12d ]3[d, 12d ]. If the share of type-1 ﬁrms in a country becomes too small, then
the state d .0 is a reﬂecting barrier; the analogous statement holds for 12d if the
share becomes too large.
Fig. 2 shows the simulation for the base case with general matching 17 . The
annual mutation rate is 5%, and the ﬁgure displays 500 years of monthly data. The
production parameters were chosen so that the home country had comparative
advantage in the ﬁrst good, the taste parameter was set so that equal shares of
income would be spent on either good, and the countries had equal populations.
This ﬁgure is essentially the time series representation of the stochastic version of
the phase diagram given in Fig. 1. The initial conditions for the world economy
were set to mimic two closed economies in long-run equilibrium that open for
trade.
The qualitative features of this ﬁgure are robust. Although there is a substantial
variance in the shares of ﬁrms in each sector, the world economy converges
rapidly to production according to comparative advantage. Shocks in the home
country that decrease the share of ﬁrms in the natural exporting industry are
propagated across borders and raise the share of foreign ﬁrms producing according
to comparative disadvantage. This is made manifest by the negative correlation
between the time series at the top of the ﬁgure and that on the bottom. There is no
tendency for the pattern of trade to reverse in the long run because the equilibrium
with comparative advantage is the basin with minimum potential. We also ran
many simulations (not shown here) of the model with restricted matching using the

Fig. 2. General matching, 500 years of monthly data (annual standard deviation of 5%).
17

The production and taste parameters are the same as before. The foreign country has relative size
L*51,
1 /z 1 s 50.05
1 /z 1 is the annual mutation rate, and d 50.01 is the reﬂecting barrier. We set G (z) 5
and G *(?)5 G (?).
2 1 /z 2 2 1 /z 2
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G

same parameters and initial conditions 18 . Again, there is rapid convergence to
production according to comparative advantage. The main difference between this
case and the general one is that the variance of the shares of ﬁrms between sectors
is lower because in the model with restricted matching ﬁrms’ decisions are
strongly reinforcing across national boundaries.
How quickly will a pattern of trade according to comparative advantage arise?
We ran repeated simulations of the general matching model starting from a
situation in which the initial conditions were severely skewed against comparative
advantage, with only 10% of the home ﬁrms in the ‘‘right’’ sector and 90% of the
foreign ﬁrms in the ‘‘wrong’’ sector. Thus initial domestic ﬁrms in the natural
exporting industry faced very severe ‘‘foreign competition,’’ and there was great
inertia in both countries keeping the pattern of trade in the wrong conﬁguration.
The median number of years during which domestic ﬁrms in the ﬁrst industry were
not predominant on the world stage was 54, and the corresponding average was
76.5. Since mutations can—and occasionally do—cause the ‘‘right’’ trade pattern
to go awry, these statistics are upper bounds for the typical waiting time for the
world economy to set itself straight. Thus for these parameter values and extreme
initial conditions, there was fairly rapid convergence to trade according to
comparative advantage.
Fig. 3 shows what can happen if the world economy starts out in an unfavorable
state and there is restricted matching. Again, the initial conditions are such that
only 10% of ﬁrms in either country are in the ‘‘right sector’’. Now, it takes four
centuries for the world economy to reach the equilibrium with comparative
advantage, but when the change occurs, it is abrupt. Thus, if the initial conditions

Fig. 3. Restricted matching, 500 years of monthly data (annual standard deviation of 5%).
18
˜
Of course, we change the Wiener process to dz i 5[e i 2z] T [Bz*dt1
sG (z)dW]z i with dz*i changed
analogously. These values imply that ẑ 1 ¯0.31 and ẑ *1 ¯0.69.

in the world economy entail the wrong pattern of specialization, the dynamic path
of world trade has the ﬂavor of Eldrige and Gould’s (Eldrige and Gould, 1972)
notion of a ‘‘punctuated equilibrium’’ in a biological system.
Since the standard deviation of the annual shocks is 5% and the reﬂecting
barrier is 1%, the share of home ﬁrms in the ﬁrst industry is almost always
between 1 and 10% in the initial phase of the world economy. Likewise, the share
of foreign ﬁrms in that industry—the wrong one for them—is most often between
90 and 99% in this phase. The lower reﬂecting barrier insures that ﬁrms are born
whenever the ﬁrst sector in the domestic economy is in danger of dying out. Still,
even if the mutation rate of ﬁrms is 5% per year, the pattern of trade is locked into
the wrong equilibrium for a long time.

7. Conclusion
This paper has applied a new technique to one of the oldest questions in
international economics and has showed that there are very sound evolutionary
foundations for the notion of comparative advantage. Our model was very simple,
perhaps unduly so. But the two-good Ricardian model with Mill–Graham
preferences has an illustrious history in the long progression of the ﬁeld of
international economics. And for us it has the added advantage that the unique
evolutionarily stable outcome in the closed economy maximizes expected social
surplus, given the inefﬁciencies inherent in the matching process. An obvious area
for future research is to study a model with more general preferences and
arbitrarily many goods. We conjecture that production according to the chain of
comparative advantage is in the stochastically stable set for a wide class of
preferences and matching models.
There is a vein of literature in international trade on vent-for-surplus models 19 .
Borrowing this term from Williams (1929) and Myint (1958) emphasizes that this
way of thinking about international trade actually goes back to a key passage in
the Wealth of Nations (ﬁfth ed., 1789):
Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them
derive two distinct beneﬁts from it. It carries out that surplus part of the
produce of their land and labor for which there is no demand, and brings
back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a
value to their superﬂuities . . . . By means of it, the narrowness of the home
market does not hinder the division of labor in any particular branch of art or

19
This paragraph was inspired by the comments of an anonymous referee. A seminal paper by Caves
(1965) helped bring these ideas to an inﬂuential audience of modern trade theorists.

manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection . . . (Vol. I, Cannan
ed., p. 413)20 .
Myint’s analysis is based on this insight, and his work can be seen broadly as a
way of describing the costs and beneﬁts of international trade in situations where
the traditional model of comparative costs may not be germane. A matching model
introduces an ineluctable element of distributive inefﬁciency into a model of
international trade. It is noteworthy that the version of our model with restricted
matching is able to capture the gains from trade due solely to increased division of
labor, even when it is not aligned with comparative advantage. In that version, one
of the evolutionary equilibria entails the ‘‘wrong’’ specialization. Still, both home
and foreign agents may well be better off with trade because in the closed
economy specialization is incomplete and half the matches are sterile. By contrast,
international trade increases the division of labor in the world economy, and
eliminates these sterile matches, thereby leading to potentially higher welfare. That
is, trade enhances economic welfare by increasing the division of labor and
enabling countries to overcome technical indivisibilities in production through a
larger market size.
Our model is a detailed analysis of trade between countries facing severe trading
frictions, and the strength of our conclusions probably lies in the fact that
comparative advantage predicts trade even in this distorted economy. Perhaps our
most important insight is that trade according to comparative advantage has a kind
of stability that has never been known before. Why, exactly, is that kind of trade
evolutionarily stable? We conjecture that comparative advantage is such a deep
property of models of productive activity that it survives many market imperfec
tions. Thus any oligopoly model that predicts trade against the pattern of
comparative advantage must have made very severe and likely fragile assumptions
about production or market structure. Evolutionary models are of course a very
simple kind of imperfect competition, and we hope our work spurs further research
in trade theory in this promising area.
What are some compelling extensions of our analysis? Studying a model with
several countries poses a more daunting technical challenge for the applied
theorist. The exact predictions of any such model will depend upon how one
divides the gains from trade when several ﬁrms meet. Likewise, the dynamics of
the world economy will be determined by the interaction between several
populations of ﬁrms. Perhaps production according to comparative advantage will
still occur, although it is also likely that the dynamics of the pattern of trade will
be very complicated indeed. This is an open area of research for international
economics or applied game theory.

20
The entire text of Cannan’s version (1904) of the ﬁfth edition of the Wealth of Nations (1789) can
be found at http: / / www.econlib.org / library / Smith / smWN.html.

Our work shows how important the exact structure of the matching process is
for a model of international trade. In the general matching model, production to
according to comparative advantage arose in a model in which we had to make
none of the many assumptions inherent in the usual neo-classical framework. In
particular, there was no assumption about rational behavior, proﬁt maximization,
or common knowledge. Although our general matching model with random
mutations showed a fairly wide variance in the distribution of ﬁrms between
sectors in a plausible simulation, convergence to comparative advantage following
trade liberalization was fairly rapid. In the model with restricted matching,
production according to comparative disadvantage could occur, although this
pattern was not in the stochastically stable set. These results stress the importance
of stimulating domestic trade simultaneously with international trade liberalization
in order to ensure specialization according to comparative advantage. The central
implication of this work is that a general model of matching or random mutations
in a restricted model of matching helps guarantee production according to
comparative advantage, even in a model with myopic agents and trading frictions.
We take this as a strong vindication of the insights of Ricardo.
8. Uncited references
Ricardo, 1963; Smith, 1776.
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Appendix A
Proposition 4.1. Complete specialization according to comparative disadvantage
is not an equilibrium.

Proof. Assume to the contrary that s5(z, z*)5((0, 1)T , (1, 0)T ) is an equilibrium.
¯ 2 . Since s is a Nash
The ﬁtness of a domestic ﬁrm is f(r, s)5 m u h r 1 1(12 m )ur
equilibrium, producing the ﬁrst good cannot yield higher ﬁtness and thus m u h #
¯ 1 1(12 m )u f r 2 .
(12 m )ū. Likewise, the ﬁtness of a foreign ﬁrm is f *(r, s)5 m ur
Since s is a Nash equilibrium, producing the second good cannot yield higher
ﬁtness and hence m ū $(12 m )u f . These two inequalities imply that u h u f #ū 2 . But
¯ ¯. Hence ū # ū, contradicting the assumption that ū . ū. h
0,u h u f 5uu
Proposition 4.2. No Nash equilibrium is such that a country is completely
specialized in the good in which it has a comparative disadvantage.
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that the home country is incompletely specialized and s5(z,
z*)5((z 1 , z 2 )T , (1, 0)T ) is a Nash equilibrium. Since a domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds it
equally proﬁtable to produce either good, m z 2 u h 5 m z 1 u h 1(12 m )ū and thus
m (z 2 2z 1 )u h 5(12 m )ū. Since this is an equilibrium, it must not be the case that a
foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to produce the second good. Hence, m z 2 ū $
m z 1 ū 1(12 m )u f . But this inequality implies that m (z 2 2z 1 )ū .(12 m )u f , where
the strict inequality follows from ū . ū. Dividing this strict inequality by the
¯ ¯ .u h u f . But this is
analogous equality yields u¯ /u h .u f /ū, which is equivalent to uu
¯ ¯ .u h u f .
a contradiction because uu
Assume next that the foreign country is incompletely specialized and thus s5(z,
z*)5((0, 1)T , (z *1 , z *2 )T ) is a Nash equilibrium. Since a foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally
proﬁtable to produce either good, (12 m )z *1 u f 5 m u¯ 1(12 m )z 2* u f and thus (12
¯ Since this is an equilibrium, a home ﬁrm cannot ﬁnd it more
m )(z *1 2z *2 )u f 5 m u.
¯ This
proﬁtable to produce the ﬁrst good and thus (12 m )z *1 ū $ m u h 1(12 m )z 2* u.
weak inequality implies that (12 m )(z *1 2z *2 )ū . m u h , where again we have used
the fact that ū . ū. Thus we may derive ū /u f .u h /ū, again a contradiction of the
¯ ¯ 5u h u f . h
fact that uu
Proposition 4.4. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both countries are
incompletely specialized.
Proof. Assume that both countries are incompletely specialized and that s5(z,
z*)5((z 1 , z 2 )T , (z *1 , z *2 )T ) is an equilibrium. Since a domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally
¯ m z 1 u h 1(12 m )z 1* u.
¯ Like
proﬁtable to produce either good, m z 2 u h 1(12 m )z *2 u5
wise, a foreign ﬁrm ﬁnds it equally proﬁtable to produce either good and
m z 2 ū 1(12 m )z *2 u f 5 m z 1 ū 1(12 m )z 1* u f . Since z 2 512z 1 and z 2* 512z 1* , the ﬁrst
equality implies m (1 2 2z 1 )u h 5 (1 2 m )(z 1* (ū 1u)
] 2 ū ) and the second implies
*
m (u] 2 z 1 (ū 1u))
5
(1
2
m
)(2z
2
1)u
.
Solving
the
ﬁrst equation for z 1* yields
1
f
]

m u h 1 (1 2 m )ū
2m u h
z *1 5 ]]]]] 2 ]]]]] z 1 .
(1 2 m )(ū 1 ū ) (1 2 m )(ū 1 ū )

Likewise, solving the second equation for z *1 yields gives

m ū 1 (1 2 m )u f
m (ū 1 ū )
z *1 5 ]]]]] 2 ]]] z 1 .
2(1 2 m )u f
2(1 2 m )u f
We will now show in two steps that this system of two equations does not have
a solution such that 0#z *1 #1. First, we will show that the intercept of the ﬁrst line
is strictly greater than that of the second line. Second, we will show that the slope
of the ﬁrst line is strictly greater than that of the second. We establish the ﬁrst step
if ( m u h 1(12 m )ū ) /(ū 1ū ).( m ū 1(12 m )u f ) / 2u f . Cross-multiplying yields the
following logically equivalent inequalities
¯ ¯ 1 2(1 2 m )uu
¯ f
2u f ( m u h 1 (1 2 m )u¯ ) . ( m u¯ 1 (1 2 m )u f )(u¯ 1 u¯ )⇔2m uu
¯ ¯ 1 2(1 2 m )uu
¯ f
. ( m u¯ 1 (1 2 m )u f )(u¯ 1 u¯ )⇔2m uu
¯ ¯ 1 m (u¯ )2 1 (1 2 m )u f u¯ 1 (1 2 m )uu
¯ f ⇔ m uu
¯¯
. m uu
¯ f . m (u¯ )2 1 (1 2 m )uu
¯ f ⇔ m (uu
¯ ¯ 2 (u¯ )2 )
1 (1 2 m )uu
¯ ¯ 2 ū )
. (1 2 m )(ū 2 ū )u f ⇔ m u(u
. (1 2 m )(ū 2 ū )u f ⇔ m ū . 2 (1 2 m )u f
¯ ¯ We now establish the second
where we have again used the fact that u f u h 5uu.
step. We must show that 2(2m u h ) /(12 m )(ū 1ū ). 2( m (ū 1ū )) / 2(12 m )u f . This
inequality is logically equivalent to this chain:
2m u h
m (ū 1 ū )
2
]]]]]
¯ ¯ , (u¯ 1 u¯ )2 ⇔0
, ]]]⇔4u h u f , (u¯ 1 u¯ ) ⇔4uu
(1 2 m )(ū 1 ū ) 2(1 2 m )u f
, (ū 2 ū )2
¯¯ h
where we have again used that u f u h 5uu.
Proposition 4.5. The pattern of production according to comparative advantage is
evolutionarily stable.
Proof. Since this is a game with two players each having ﬁnitely many pure
strategies, it has an equilibrium. Proposition 4.4 shows that the equilibrium cannot
have both players mixing simultaneously. Also, Proposition 4.2 implies that a
country is completely specialized only if it is producing according to comparative
advantage.
Consider ﬁrst a Nash equilibrium in which the home ﬁrms are completely
specialized and thus s5(z, z*)5((1, 0)T , (z *1 , z *2 )T ). Since domestic ﬁrms produce
¯ *1 . Let ´ .0 be sufﬁciently small,
only the ﬁrst good, (12 m )z *2 ū $ m u h 1(12 m )uz

and consider a mutation by a share ´ of domestic ﬁrms where these ﬁrms produce
only the second good. The ﬁtness of the (domestic) mutants is f(r, s´ )5 m (12
¯ and the ﬁtness of the rest of the domestic ﬁrms is f(z,
´)u h 1(12 m )z *1 u,
¯ Since ´ .0, the weak inequality implies that f(r, s´ ),f(z,
s´ )5 m´u h 1(12 m )z *2 u.
s´ ) and thus specializing in the ﬁrst good is evolutionarily stable.
Consider next a Nash equilibrium in which the domestic ﬁrms are incompletely
specialized and the foreign ﬁrms are completely specialized. Now s5(z, z*)5((z 1 ,
z 2 )T , (0, 1)T ). Since domestic ﬁrms are indifferent between producing either good,
m z 2 u h 1(12 m )ū5 m z 1 u h . Again, consider a mutation by a sufﬁciently small share
´ .0 of domestic ﬁrms that produce only the ﬁrst good. (Producing the second
good will obviously lower the mutants’ ﬁtness since they give up all matches
according to comparative advantage with foreign ﬁrms.) The ﬁtness of the
domestic mutants is f(r, s´ )5 m z 2 (12 ´)u h 1(12 m )ū, and the ﬁtness of the rest of
the population of domestic ﬁrms is f(z, s´ )5z 1 [ m z 2 (12 ´)u h 1(12 m )ū ]1
z 2 m [z 1 (12 ´)1 ´ ]u h . Hence, the difference f(z, s´ )2f(r, s´ )5(z 1 21)[ m z 2 (12
´)u h 1(12 m )ū ]1z 2 m [z 1 (12 ´)1 ´ ]u h
5 (z 1 2 1)[ m z 2 u h 1 (1 2 m )ū 2 ´m z 2 u h ] 1 z 2 m [z 1 (1 2 ´) 1 ´ ]u h
5 (z 1 2 1)[ m z 1 u h 2 ´m z 2 u h ] 1 (1 2 z 1 )m [z 1 1 ´(1 2 z 1 )]u h
(using m z 2 u h 1(12 m )ū5 m z 1 u h and z 2 512z 1 )
5 m u h (z 1 2 1)[z 1 2 ´z 2 ] 1 (1 2 z 1 )m [z 1 1 ´(1 2 z 1 )]u h
5 m u h (z 1 2 1)[(1 1 ´)z 1 2 ´ 2 z 1 2 ´(1 2 z 1 )]
(using z 2 512z 1 and factoring common terms)
5 2m u h ´(z 1 2 1)2 . 0.
Since the labels ‘‘home ﬁrm’’ and ‘‘good 1’’ were arbitrary, it is obvious that these
arguments generalize to the relevant cases for the foreign ﬁrm. h
Proposition 5.1. Impose Assumptions 4 and 5. Then there are two evolutionarily
stable strategies, one with production according to comparative advantage and
another with production according to comparative disadvantage.
Proof. There are three Nash equilibria: ((1, 0)T , (0, 1)T ), ((0, 1)T , (1, 0)T ), and
ŝ 5 ((ẑ 1 , zˆ 2 )T , (ẑ *1 , zˆ 2* )T ), where ẑ 1 5 ũ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ), ẑ 2 5 ũ˜ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ), ẑ 1* 5 ũ˜ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ),
and ẑ *2 5 u˜ /(u˜˜ 1 u˜ ). The ﬁrst two are strict Nash equilibria and thus are
evolutionarily stable strategies for this game with a bimorphic population.
Now consider the (mixed strategy) equilibrium ŝ. Since domestic ﬁrms never
meet each other, a small share can deviate and produce the ﬁrst good without
lowering their average ﬁtness as compared with the rest of the population of
domestic ﬁrms. So this equilibrium is not evolutionarily stable. h
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